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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as Admini-
strator of the Estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston, Deceased, . _- · 
.Appellant, 
vs. 
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS 
BANK, a Utah Corporation, 
Resp-ondent. 




ROGER T. HARMSTON, as. the Ad-
ministrator of the Estate of Isabelle 
T. Harmston, Deceased, HELENE 
E. GILLIS, MARION EUGENE 
HARMSTON, ROGERS T. HARMS-
TON and FRED HARMSTON, 
Case No. 7614 
Appellants, 
vs. 
KENNETH LABRUM and JEAN 
CRUMBO LABRUM, his wife, and 
EDGAR LABRUM and VEDA 
MURRAY LABRUM, his wife, 
Respondents. 
District Court Docket No. 2513. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEME:NT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
The Statement of the case contained in Appellants' 
Brief is correct so far as it goes, except that one of the 
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mortgages foreclosed by the Farmers & Merchants 
Bank was for $2,500.00 and not $3,000.00 as stated in 
Appellants' Brief. (R.· 265.) (Throughout this Brief 
the judgment Roll is indicated by the Letter R and 
the transcript by the letters Tr.) The reference to 
some of the facts disclosed by this record should, in 
our opinion, be given in greater detail than· that con-
tained in Appellants' Brief, and there are other facts 
not mentioned in Appellants' Brief which, as we view 
them, are necessary to an understanding of the ques-
tions which divide the parties to this controversy. 
As stated in Appellants' Brief, in the action 
brought against the Farmers and Merc~ants Bank, 
the plaintiff seeks to set 'aside the mortgage ·foreclosures 
prosecuted by the bank against Roger T. Harms ton 
as Administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, 
deceased, et al. To the amended complaint filed in 
this case the Bank filed a demurrer to each of the two 
causes of action alleged in the Amended Complaint. 
The demurrers are hoth general and special and both 
causes of action are attached by the demurrers (R. 
200-201). The demurrers were overruled (R. 205). 
The defendant Bank claims that the demurrers should 
have been sustained. As .indicated in Appellants' Brief, 
most of the Facts are not in dispute. Briefly the 
facts as alleged in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint are 
admitted by the defendant Bank. 
The:r;e is no controversy as to the existence of the 
following facts. 
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Isabelle T. Harmston died intestate on December 
. . . 
11, 19~7. At the time of her death she owned the prop-
erty described in the mortgages given to the Farmers 
and Merchants Bank. 
For a time the Utah Savings and Trust· Company 
acted as administrator of Isabelle T. Harmston'-s estate. 
On July 31, 1937, Isabelle T. Harms ton made;; executed 
and delivered to the Farmers and Merchants Bank 
her promissory note for $4,500.00, which note was 
secured with a mortgage executed by Mrs. Harmston 
on part of the real estate involved in this proceeding. 
On October 19, 1937, Mrs. Harmston executed and 
delivered to the Farmers and Merchants Bank another 
mortgage in the sum of $2,500.00, which note was also 
secured by a mortgage on part of the p-roperty involved 
in this action. The mortgages were duly recorded in 
Duchesne County, the same being the county in which 
the property w-as situated. The property was leased 
at the time the same was mortgaged and the leases were 
assigned to the bank as additional security. Prior to 
bringing the foreclosure proceedings, claims were pre-
sented to th_e Utah :Savings and _T~ust Company,; wh~ch 
at the time such claims were presented, was the ·ad-
ministrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, De-
·ceased, and such claims were by the ·administrator ap-
proves . 
. On December 7, 1940, the Utah Savings and Trust 
Company was removed as administrator of the estate 
of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased, and Roger T. Harm-
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ston' the . plaintiff herein, was by the court · ordered 
appointed · administrator .of said estate in the stead 
arid place of the Utah Savings and Trust Company. 
The order required Roger T. Harmston to take the 
oath of office and furnish a bond in the sum of $1,500.00 
if a corporate bond. 
Roger T. Harms ton furnished the required cor-
porate bond and the same was filed on March 8, 1941. 
At the time of trial there was no record in the Probate 
Files of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, or in the 
other court records, showing that Roger T. Harmston 
took the oath of office prior to February 4, 1948. Nor 
do the probate files show that letters of administration 
were issued to Roger T. Harmston prior to that date. 
It is further alleged in plaintiff's Amended Com-
plaint herein and by the Answer of the defendant herein 
admitted that on May 9, 1941, the Farmers and Mer-
chants Bank filed its complaints to foreclose the 
mortgages on the property mortgaged to the bank by 
Isabelle T. Harmston. That in such action Roger T. 
Harmston, as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle 
·T. Harmston, was nH~med as one of the ·defendants; 
that after the complaints were filed in said action 
Summons wer~ placed in the hands of the Sheriff of 
Duchesne County and on May 13, 1941, the said ·Sheriff 
personally served such Summonses upon Roger T. 
Harmston as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle 
T. Harmston, deceased. Plaintiff in his Amended 
Complaip.t ;alleges that in truth and in fact, Roger T. 
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Harmston was not at the time of the commencement 
of the actions to forclose the mortgages or at the time 
of the service of such summonses upon him, the admin-
istrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. 
It is further made to appear that on July 17, 1941, 
judgment by default was entered against Roger T. 
Harmston, and in favor of the Farmers and Merchants 
Bank, foreclosing the two mortgages executed by Isa-
belle T. Harmston during her lifetime; that pursuant 
to such decrees of foreclosure, the property was adver-
tised for sale and sold by the Sheriff of Duchesne 
County, and in due time on March 12, 1942, the Sheriff 
of Duchesne ·County executed and delivered a Sheriff's 
Deed to the Farmers and Merchants Bank, the pur-
chaser of the property at the Sheriff's sale, and that the 
bank has, since March 12, 1942, been in possession of 
the property so sold and has collected the rents and 
profits derived from said property. The foregoing 
facts are alleged in plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
and will be found on Pages 173 to 199 of the Judgment 
Roll. In its answer the Bank admits all of the allega-
tions contained in plaintiff's Amended Complaint except 
defendant alleges on information and belief that Roger 
T. Harmston was the administrator of the Estate of 
Isabelle T. Harmston, fro~ and after May 9, 1941. The 
Answer and Counterclaim of the defendant bank will 
be found on Pages 209 to 230 of the Judgment Roll. 
It will thus be seen that the only issues of fact 
raised by the pleadings so far as the same affect the 
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foreclosure proceedings is whether or not Roger T. 
Harmston had taken his oath of office and Letters of 
Administration had issued to him when the Complaint 
was filed and when he was served with Summons. 
In its Answer and Counterclaim the defendant 
bank· sought to defeat plaintiff's attempt to set aside 
the judgments of foreclosure and if that could not be 
done, then to foreclose its mortgages in this action 
pursuant to the allegations of the Counterclaim. 
It will thus be seen that by the Stipulation men-
tioned in Appellants' Brief it was agreed that the first 
issue that should be tried was whether or not the 
mortgage foreclosures precluded the plaintiff from 
prosecuting the pres.ent action. Of course, if it should 
be determined that the mortgage foreclosures were 
valid and by reason thereof the property foreclosed 
was no longer a part of the Estate of Isabelle Harm-
ston, _then there is no occasion to again foreclose such 
mortgages pursuant to the allegations of defendants' 
Counterclaim. If, on the other hand, it should be deter-
mined that the mortgage fo~eclosures were invalid, then 
the issues raised by the ·Counterclaim must be tried. 
The evidence which was offered and received 
touching the controversy as to whether or not Roger 
T. Harmston did or did not take an oath o~ office on or 
about March 8, 1941 is brought here for review by a 
transcript of the evidence. 
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As stated in appellants' Brief, there was no oath 
of office of Roger T. Harmston at the time of the trial 
. in the files of Isabelle T. Harms ton's estate, ·nor was 
there any other court · record that an oath of office 
had been filed, except in each of the mortgage £ore-
closures the court found:_ ''That Roger T._ Harmston 
h~s been appointed as administrator of tlle Estate of 
Isabelle- T. Harmston, n·eceased, and he is now the-'·duly 
appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased." Tr. 101 
as to the foreclosure of the mortgage for $4,500.00 and 
Tr. 117 as to the foreclosure of the mortgage for 
$2,500.00. 
At the commencement of the trial, it was agreed 
that the foreclosure proceedings were regular in every 
particular except with respect to whether or not Roge:r 
T. Harmston had taken his oath of office and whether 
or not Letters of Administration had issued to him 
at or before the time the foreclosure actions were 
brought, and .at or before the time service of summons 
was had upon Rogers T. Harmston. (Tr. 3-4.) 
Plaintiff called the County ·Clerk of Duchesne 
County, who identified the files. in the Estate of Isa-
belle T. Harmston, Deceased. He testified that the 
only Letters of Administration in the files were dated 
February 10, 1948 (Tr. 7). He further testified that 
the only oath of office was one taken before R. J. 
Hogan, on February 4, 1948, which appears to have 
been filed on February 10, 1948 (Tr. 8). 
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,It further is made to appear that prior. to Sep-_ 
tember 4, 1940, Roger T. Harms ton, one of the heirs 
at law of Isabelle T. I!armston, had filed a petition 
praying that he be appointed administrator of his 
mother's estate; that he personally appeared in_ court 
represente-d by his counsel (Tr. 9-10). That Roger T. 
Har~n~ton was appointed administrator of th~: _.Estate 
to take effect on November 18, 1940. The order was 
not signed until December 4, 1940 (Tr. 12). On March 
8, 1941, a bond dated February 27, 1941, for the sum 
of $1,500.00 was filed in which bond Rogers T. H-arm-
ston is named as principal (Trs. 14-15). County Clerk 
Merrill further testified that the Register of Actions 
failed to show that any Letters of Administration were 
issued to Roger T. Harmston prior to February 10, 
1948 (Tr. 17). 
The County Clerk, on cross e~amination, further 
testified that the one-half of the outside cover of the 
files -in the Isabelle H;:armston Estate had been torn 
off (Tr. 19). That the fact that the cover on the files 
in the Isabelle Harmston Estate was in part torn off 
was first called to his attention in 1947, at which time 
he put on a new cover (Tr. 20). 
On 'Cross examination Roger T. Harmston testi-
fied that he had collected the income from· Lots 5 to 
12, Block 16, Plat A, Roosevelt Townsite (owned by 
the Estate of Isabelle r.- Harmston) since he bought it 
in for taxes. (Tr. 46-47.) That he signed the bond in 
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the files- of his mother's estate. (Tr. 57.) That the 
property he bought for taxes is the prop.erty of his 
mother's estate. (Tr. 58.) That he has been collecting 
the rent on that property. (Tr. 59.) That he didn't 
remember whether he was or was not served with 
summons in the foreclosure proceedings. That he did 
know the pro:rerty of his m·other was being fhreclbsed. 
(Tr. 64.) 
G. Arthur Goodrich was called as a witness by the 
defendant and testified that he was County Clerk of 
Duchesne County, Utah, from 193.5 to 1942. He identi-
fied defendant's Exhibit 3 as being a letter, the latter 
.... 
part of which was dictated by him. It will be noted 
that among other things, it is said that ''On March 
8, 1941, Rodger T. Harmston filed his bond arid oath 
of office and is now the acting and qualified admin-
istrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. '' He 
testified that he dictated that letter and over objec-
tions he further testified that while he did not actually 
remember the oath of office referred to in the letter 
I 
as being in the office when the letter was dictated, the 
oath must have been in the office when the latter ·was 
dictated; otherwise he would not have dictated the 
same (Tr. 78). That when he dictated letters relative 
to the records in the office he always had such records 
before him (Tr. 79). 
Arlene Smith was called as a witness by defend-
ant and testified that she was a deputy clerk of 
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Duchesne County from February, 1940, until Novem. 
ber, 1942; that Mr. Goodrich, the ·County Cler:K, aic. 
tated letters to her (Tr. 84-5). That when Mr. Good. 
rich dictated letters about the records in the office 
he would examine the records and dictate the letters 
from such· records. That was his uniform practice. 
That she was in the office when defendant's Exhibit 
3 was written so that she probably wrote the same 
(Tr. 85 ). 
Edna T. Hartman was called as a witness by the 
defendant and testified that she worked as a deputy 
county clerk from 1935 to spring of 1941, except for 
two months in the summer; that she did some more 
work in the fall of 1943; that when Mr. Goodrich, the 
County Clerk, dictated letters as to matters relating 
to the records in the office, he always dictated the same 
with the records before him (Tr. 90). 
J. Rulon Morgan was sworn and testified for the 
defendant b:ank: That he was the attorney for the 
Farmers :and Merchants Bank and conducted the mort-
gage foreclosure proceedings in the two cases involved 
in this· proceeding; that· he testified in such foreclosure 
proceedings; that when he so testified he had before 
him the files in the matter of the Estate of Isabelle 
T. Ha~mston, and ther~ was an oath of office of Roger 
T. Harmston (Tr. 94 and 9p). This testimony of Mr. 
Morgan was received over the objection of counsel for 
plaintiff. 
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Not,vithstanding Roger T. Harmston testified at 
considerable length he· did not testify that he· had not 
taken an oath of offic.e in the matter of the Estate 
of Isabelle T. Harms ton, deceased. 
As stated in Appellants' Brief, the property in-
volved. in the case against the Lab rums was purchased 
from the Bank after it secured the Sheriff's Deed, pur-
suant to the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
As an additional Reason Why the Judgment Ap-
pealed From Should Be Affirmed. The Defendant 
Claims That The Court Was In Error In Its Ruling 
In The Following Particulars: 
STATEMENT OF CROSS ERRORS 
I. The Trial Court w:as in error in overruling the 
demurrer of the defendant to the effect that the al-
legations contained in plaintiff's first cause of action 
do not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of 
action ( R. 200). 
IT. The Trial Court was in error in overruling 
the ·demurrer of the defendant to the effect that the 
allegations contained in plaintiff's second cause of 
action· do not state ·sufficient facts to constitute a cause 
of !action (R. 201). 
III. That the Trial Court erred in overruling the 
demurrer to each of the two causes of action alleged 
in the amended complaint upon the ground that the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
allegations therein contained are uncertain and ambig-
uous- in- that no facts are therein -alleged upon which 
plaintiff, in this case, claims that he has a· meritoriou-s 
defense to the foreclosure of· the mortgages which 
were·· foreclosed by the defendant and which mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings plaintiff herein seeks· to have 
vacated ·(R~ 200 & 201). - -
IV. The Court was in error in overruling the de-
murrer to each of the causes of action upon the ground 
that the court was and is without jurisdiction to vacate 
or amend the judgments attacked because of the pro ... 
visions of U.C.A., 1943_, 104-14-4 (R. 201). 
ARGUMENT 
It will be noted that no claim is made that the 
defendant was not personally served with Summons. 
The Complaints in the foreclosure proceeding were 
filed May 9, 1941 (R. 177). Service of Summons- was 
had personally on Roger T. H·armston May 13, 1941 
(R. 178). It also appears from the pleadings that the 
Judgments sought to be vacated were entered on July 
17, 1941 (R. 195 & -199). The sheriffs' deeds were 
issued on March 13, 1942 (R. 179 & 186). This action 
was commenct3d by filing a Complaint on February 20, 
1948 (R. 160). Thus, 6 years, 9 months and 11 days 
elapsed between the time the plaintiff in this action and 
the defendant in the. foreclosure action was s-erved with 
Summons in the foreclosure action and the time the 
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present action 'vas commenced. There is nothing in the 
record which even remotely i~dicates any justification 
for this long delay. Of course, the value of the prop-
erty involved has doubtless increased, but such .fact 
could not well be urged· as an excuse for such delay. 
While we shall contend that the judgment appealed 
from should be affirmed because the facbr fo-q.11d. by 
the trial court must be sustained, we wish at the out-
set to direct the attention of the court to the questions 
of law raised by the demurrers to plaintiff's Amended 
·Complaint. 
POINTS ONE AND TWO 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE 
SUFFICIENT FACTS TO ENTITLE PLAINTIFF TO ANY 
RELIEF. 
While there are a few cases to the contrary, the 
authorities generally are to the effect that judgments 
shown by court records impart absolute verity, espe-
cially when attached collaterally and that extrinsic evi-
dence is not admissible to show that the court was 
without jurisdiction. Freeman on Judgments 5 Edi. 
tion, page 785, Sec. 375 and cases cited in note 14 to 
the text. On pages 792-93 of the same volume the 
learned author says : 
''And it is so necessary that confidence should 
be reposed in court of a higher -character as well 
as in records of such courts that on the whole 
and in view of all the considerations affecting 
the subject, it is the only safe rule to give the 
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decisions of -courts of general jurisdiction full 
effect so long as they remain in force rather 
than to leave them open to be attached in every 
way and on all occasions. Being domestic judg-
ments, they can, if erroneous, be reviewed by 
proceedings instituted directly for the· purpose 
and reviewed on error or by a new trial, ·and 
if the danger is imminent and special, relief can 
be temporarily, if not finally, obtained by ap-
plication to a -court of equity. Any other rule 
with regard to judgments of such courts would 
be attended in its application with very great 
embarrassment and would be very dangerous 
in its general operation. The general good clearly 
requires and has heretofore established the rule 
that domestic judgments of courts of general 
jurisdiction cannot be attached -collaterally.'' 
Again on Pages 807-808 of the same volume, it 
is said: 
''A finding or recital showing that the court 
had jurisdiction is, in the vast majority of the 
states, not disputable when a judgment based 
thereon is drawn in question collaterally, par-
ticularly where the other p·ortions of the record 
are silent as to jurisdictional step·s as. where 
the judgment finds that jurisdiction attached 
and no process or service or return of process 
appears in the record. In such eases the record 
will be taken to affirmatively show jurisdiction.'' 
In sup·port of the Text the following cases are 
cited, which support the text: Kavanaugh vs. Hamilton, 
53 ~Colo. 157; 125 Pac. 512; Virginia and 'West Virginia 
Oaal ·Co., vs. Charles, 251, Fed. 83; Searl vs. Galbreath 
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73 lli. 269. To the same effect is S(J).lt L·ake City vs. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 82 Utah 179; 22 Pac. 
(2), 1048. 
The authorities also teach as we view them, that 
the attack made by the plaintiff up·on the judgments 
of foreclosure is a collateral and not a direct attack. 
In Volume 1, page 608 of Freeman on Judgments, 5 
Edition, a collateral attack on a judgment is thus 
explained: 
''If on the other hand the direct purpose and 
aim of the proceeding is .to obtain some other 
relief than the vacation or setting aside of the 
judgment, and the attack upon the judgment 
is merely incidentally involved, it will be con-
sidered 1a collateral attack, though relief from 
the judgment may ·also be necessary under the 
circumstances. Thus, where the primary relief 
in a suit is the recovery of land and the setting 
aside of a judgment through which defendants 
claim title is only an incident to that relief, the 
rights of the parties must be adjudged by the 
rules applicable to collateral ·attack.'' 
O'Neill vs. Bohien, 13 Idaho 721; 93 Pac. 20; Wilcox 
vs. Superior Court, 151 Appeal Division 297; 186 N. Y. 
Supp. 377. 
In the case from Idaho just cited, the law is thus 
stated: 
"The attack upon a judgment is collateral if 
the action or proceeding has an independent pur-
pose and contempl'ates some other relief, or 
results, than the mere setting aside of the judg-
ment, although the setting aside of the judg-
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· ment .may. be necessary to se·cure such independ-
ent P":U'Pose." · . 
. To the same effect is z;tier:mill vs. Nash, 94 Utah 
271, 75 Pac. (2d) 157. 
.. 
It will -~~ noted from. the Amended Complait~t that 
the p~aintiff in . this action ~s, among other things, 
seeking an accounting of the rents and profits· that 
defendant bank has collected since it went into posses-
sion of the property pursuant to its Sheriff's Deeds. 
Plaintiff also seeks to recover the land covered by the 
mortgage, inclu~ing that sold to the Labrums. That 
being so, the attack upon the judgment is collateral and 
it !appearing from the Amended Complaint that all of 
the proceedings had in the mortgage foreclosure pro-
ceedings are regular on their face, the plaintiff may 
not be heard to complain. 
The doctrine above stated will also be found stated 
in Volume 1 of Black on Judgments, Sec. 252, Page 
306. 
Moreover "One who is objecting to a judgment on 
the ground that it was entered without personal jur-
isdiction must limit his. subsequent appearance in the 
case to the sole purpose of having the judgment va-
cated. In this and other cases of act which amounts to 
a general :appearance confers jurisdiction and defeats 
any objection based on its lack.'' Freeman on J udg-
ments, Volume 1, ·Sec. 265, page 530; B111rdette vs. Cor-
gan, 26 Kan. 102; Whitehead vs. Post 2 Ohio D.iv. Re-
print 4·68; Yorke vs. Yorke 3 N.D. 343; 55 NW 1095; 
Myers vs. Myers, 27 Ore. 133; 39 Pac. 1022; Gilbert 
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Arnold Land Co. vs. O'H(}).re, 93 Wis. 194; 67 N.W. 138. 
Even though the applicant in terms limits his appear-
ance to the special purpose of vacating the judgment 
if his application embraces other grounds than the 
jurisdictional one it is an· appearance on merits. Free-
man· on Judgments, 5 Edition, Volume 1, Page 552, 
Sec. 280-281. · · ,._, 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING 
TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S DEMURRER TO EACH OF 
THE TWO CAUSES OF ACTION BECAUSE THE ALLEGA-
TIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT ARE 
UNCERTAIN AND AMBIGUOUS. 
It will be observed that in his Amended Complaint 
the plaintiff (touching the matter of having a defense 
to the foreclosure of the mortgages), contents himself 
with merely alleging that the plaintiff as administra-
tor of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, has now 
and there always has been a good and meritorious de-
fense to the aforementioned civil actions (1931 and 
1932), but has never had_ an opportunity to p-resent the 
same (R. 182 and 88). Obviously, the language just 
quoted does not inform. either the court or counsel of 
any facts which plaintiff claims constitutes a defense 
to the mortgage foreclosure suits. In this connection 
the authorities generally hold that the facts themselves, 
rather· than the conclusions to be drawn fr~m them, 
must be stated and it is: not sufficient merely to state 
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facts from which a defense may be inferred. Th:at the 
moving party should disclose his cause of action or 
grounds of defense with such particularity as enables 
the court to determine whether or not it is good and 
sufficient on the merits. Freeman on Judgrri.ents, 5 
Edition, Vol. 1, page 560, Sec. · 283 and cases there 
cited. 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN OVERRULING THE 
DEMURRER TO EACH OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION 
UPON THE GROUND THAT THE COURT WAS AND IS 
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO VACATE OR AMEND THE 
JUDGMENTS ATTACHED BECAUSE OF THE PRO~­
SIONS OF U.C.A. 1943 - 104-14-4. 
Under the provisions of U.C.A. 1943-104-14-4, a 
party who deems himself :aggrieved, may, within ninety 
days after a judgment is rendered, apply to the court 
to be relieved from such judgment because of mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. So far 
as appears from the allegations of the Amended Com-
plaint, none of the grounds mentioned in the statute 
are here present. It is made to appear from the al-
legations of the Amended Complaint that the plaintiff 
was personally served with .summons; that from the 
time the Sheriff's Deed was issued the Bank was in 
the. possession of the property and collected the rents 
and profits therefrom. So far as ·ap·pears from the 
allegations of the Amended Complaint, nothing what-
soever was done by way of questioning the validity of 
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the decrees of foreclosure until the present proceeding 
was commenced, whicl!, as we have heretofore stated 
in this Brief, was 6 years, 9 months and 11 days after 
Summons was served upon the plaintiff herein in the 
fore~losure action. Courts of equity do not look with 
favor on such stale claims. People vs, Swalm, SO ·Cal. 
199; 22 Pac. 66. 
Turning now to the matters relied upon by the 
Appellant for a reversal of the judgment, it will be 
noted that he relies primarily upon the claim· that 
the facts found by the trial court are not· supported 
by competent evidence. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS ON THE PLAINTIFF 
TO PROVE THAT THE DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE 
COUNTY DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE 
JUDGMENTS OF FORECLOSURE AND NOT ON THE 
DEFENDANT TO SHOW THAT THE COURT DID HAVE 
JURISDICTION TO ENTER SUCH JUD.GMENTS OF FORE .. 
CLOSURE. 
In our research we find the authorities generally 
teach as· stated by our own court in the case of Inter-
mill vs. Nash, supra, that: 
''A judgment upon its face, or the· judgment 
roll upon inspection,. may show, First, that the 
court had jurisdiction of the res and p·arties ; 
second, that the eourt did not have jurisdiction 
of the res or of the partie~s, or third, the record 
may be silent on the question of jurisdiction. In 
the first instance, the record supplies all the 
evidence ; in the second instance, the record 
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shows the judgment void, and in the third situa. 
tion, the record imparting verity, jurisdiction in 
the . c,ourt entering · the judgment is presumed, 
since every ·court has the initial right and duty 
to pass upon its own jurisdiction.'' 
In :the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the record 
shows that Roger T. Harmston, as administrator. of 
the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, was personally 
served with summons, and it is so -alleged in the 
Amended Complaint as to each of the causes of action 
(R. 178 and 185). In its Findings on each of the mort-
gage foreclosure proceedings, the court found that 
Roger T~ Harmston has been appointed as administra-
tor of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased, 
and he is now the duly appointed, qualified and· act-
ing administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harm-
ston, Deceased ( Trs. 101 and 117). Thus, looking to 
the record in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, 
it affirmatively appears that the court had jurisdiction 
of the res and the parties. It is only by going outside 
of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings and examin-
ing the proceedings in the Matter of the Estate of 
Isabelle -T. Harmston, that any documents are found 
missing touching the quest1on of whether or not Roger 
T. Harmston was or was not the qualified administra-
tor of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. The records 
in that estate shows that Roger T. Harmston was ap-
pointed administrator and he furnished and signed a 
bond as ordered by the court. It is so :admitted (Trs. 
43). That Roger T. Harmston signed such bond (Trs. 
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57-58). He did not, however, remember signing or filing 
a bond (Tr. 44). Thus, the record in the M1atter of the 
Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston affirmatively shows 
that all was done touching the appointment and qualifi-
cation of Roger T. Harmston, :as administrator of Isa-
belle T. Harmston's .. E:state, except taking the oath. 
There is nothing in the ··records of that estate; ex;cept 
the absence of any record showing that an oath . of 
office was taken, that shows, or te.nds to show, that 
an oath of office was not taken. Thus, as stated by the 
authorities in the absence of a record to the. contrary, 
the record imparts verity and jurisdiction of the court 
on entering a judgment is presumed,- since every court 
has the initial right and duty to pass upon its own 
jurisdiction. 
We are mindful that there was not involved in 
the mortgage foreclosure proceedings the question of 
the validity of any order or judgment rendered in the 
matter of the Estate of Isabelle .T. Harmston. How-
ever, if an order or judgment had been made in the 
matter of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, and such 
order or ~udgment were to be attached on the g~ound 
that Roger T. Harmston w:as not the administrator 
of such estate because the record failed to show that 
he had taken an oath of office, such a contention could 
not be sustained because the court would presume that 
he had taken his oath of office ·and the same had been 
lost and the clerk had neglected to make a record of 
the oath and Letters of Administration. Such as we 
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understand it is the doctrine of this court as announced 
in the case of Intermill vs. Nash, supra; Amy vs~ Amy, 
12 Utah 278, 142 P'ac. 1121; Hoagland vs. Hoagland, 
19 Utah 108 ; 57 Pac. · 20. · · If. ·the court would assume 
that an administrator had taken the oath of office in 
an attack made upon a judgment or order entered in 
the probate proceedings, for stronger reasons will the 
court assume that an oath of office was taken in an-
other action where such court expressly finds that an 
oath of office had been taken. 
THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT 
WAS PROPERLY RECEIVED BY THE COURT. 
As we gather from plaintiff's Brief, it 1s con-
tended that no evidence was admissable touching the 
question of whether of not Roger T. Harmston had 
taken an oath of office other than that contained in 
the Probate Proceedings in the Matter of the Estate 
of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, and the records 
which the law provides should be made of such pro .. 
ceedings. If that is so, then the plaintiff must, of 
necessity, fail in his attempt to vacate the judgments 
of foreclosure which he seeks to vacate. As we have 
heretofore pointed out and as this and the co~rts 
generally hold, a judgment is not vulnerable to at-
tack by a mere showing that the record fails to show 
that jurisdiction was . acquired. If the attack is col .. 
lateral, th~ record itself must affirmatively show that 
the court rendering the judgment was without juris-
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diction to render the same before the judgment may be 
vacated. It is not sufficient to show merely that the 
record fails to show th·at the court did h·ave jurisdic-
tion because in such case the court will presume that 
the court rendering the judgment did have jurisdic-
tion. On the other hand, in a direct attack on a judg-
ment, evidence may be received to show that the court 
did not have jurisdiction in those cases where the rec-
ord is silent as to whether or not the court did have 
jurisdiction and :also in those cases where the court 
erroneously finds that it did have jurisdiction. Indeed 
it is of the very essence of making a direct attack 
upon a judgment to thereby permit the introduction 
of evidence, both oral and documentary, to show that 
the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction. 
As we understand plaintiff's position in this case, 
he contends that by his ple!ading he is making a direct 
attack on the judgments in the foreclosure proc_eedings. 
If we are correct in our understanding of plaintiff's 
claim in such particular, then it follows that he may 
offer evidence that dehors the record if that court was 
in error when it found in the m<;>rtgage foreclosure pro-
ceedings that Roger T. Harmston was the duly ap-
pointed, qualified and acting administrator of the 
Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. ·Even in a 
direct attack unless there is affirmative evidence show-
ing that Roger T. H:a,rmston was not such administra-
tor, the court is bound to conclude that he was the 
administrator notwithstanding the record is silent as 
to whether he did or did not take an oath of office. 
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With the foregoing doctrine in- mind, let us briefly 
examine the evidence offered at the trial of this case: 
Roger T. Harmston was called as a witness, but 
he failed to testify that he did not take an oath of 
office. Indeed it is a fair inference from the evidence 
he did give that he did not know whether he had or had 
not taken an· oath of office. Notwithstanding he had 
signed and filed a bond, he did not remember of ever 
signing or filing such bond (Tr. 44). If he could not 
remember -signing or filing !a bond, it is doubtful if 
he could remember anything about taking an oath of 
office. 
The only other evidence offered by the plaintiff 
was the records and files in the Matter of the Estate 
of Isabelle T. Harmston, Deceased, together with cer-
tain books that the Clerk of the Court is required to 
keep and therein record certain proceedings and doc-
uments of the court. In the records which the law re-
quires the clerk to keep, there was- an absnece of any 
record showing that an oath of office had been taken 
and of course there was no record showing that an 
oath of office had not been taken. While, in our opinion, 
the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case, even 
if his, pleadings constitute a direct att-ack, still the de-
fendant went forward with evidence tending to show 
that the plaintiff did take an oath of office at or about 
the time he filed his bond. Needless to say that if the 
plaintiff may offer evidence other than the records 
tending to show that the court rendering a judgment 
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tiff may offer similar evidence to show that the court 
did have jurisdiction. 
Defendant called four- witnesses who testified as 
to facts which ·showed or tended to show that Roger 
T. Harinston had taken an oath of office and ·Letters 
of Administration had issued to him prior to the time 
the actions were comtnenced to foreclose the mort~ 
gages held by the defendant bank. We have hereto-
for directed the court's attention to such evidence. 
Briefly the evidence is this: G. ·Arthur Goodrich testi-
fied that he was County Clerk of Duchesne County, 
Utah, from 1935 to 1942; that he dictated the docu-
ment marked Exhibit 3 (Tr. 77) ; that it was his prac-
tice, while acting as County Clerk, in answering in-
quiries about the documents filed in his office, to have 
the documents before him when he dictate-d letters con-
cerning the same; that while he did not actually remem-. 
ber what was in the files of the Estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston when he dictated Exhibit 3, he would not 
have written that letter if an oath of office. .. was ~Qt 
in the files (Trs. 78). Both Mrs·. Arlene Smith and 
Mrs. Edna T. Hartm!an testified that they had worked 
in· the office with Mr. Goodrich while he was :county 
Clerk and that he always had the records of the cou·rt 
before him when he wrote letters concerning the con-
tents thereof (Tr. 89-91). In the letter, Exhibit 3, it 
is in part said: ''On March 8, 1941, Roger T. -Harm-
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ston filed his bond and oath of office and is now the 
acting and qualified administrator of the e~tate .of 
Isabelle T. Harms ton.'' · 
J. Rulon Morgan testified that when he took the 
judgments of foreclosure which are involved in this 
controversy, he had before him the files in the Estate 
of· Isabelle. T. Harmston, deceased, and that in such 
files was an oath of office of Roger T. Harmston (Tr. 
94). There is also evidence that the files in the matter 
of th·e estate of Isabelle T. Harmston had been some-
wh-at mutilated and it was necessary to put a new cover 
on the same (Tr. 19). In the light of this evidence, ~and 
the fact that in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings 
the trial court found that Roger T. Harms ton was the 
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of 
the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, the trial court in 
this case could not have foun·d other than as did the 
court. in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. 
We have no quarrel with the law stated on Page 
15 of Appellants' Brief where a quotation is taken from 
32 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 738, (inacurately 
stated to be on Page 728), Sec. 809 (a), where it is 
stated '' 'I:ha t proceedings, orders, judgments and de-
crees . of courts of record cannot be proved by parole 
evidence, unless the record is lost or destroyed or 
othe-rwise inaccessible and a properly authenticated 
copy or transcripf thereof cannot be obtained.'' The 
converse is also true. 
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In this ca.se the evidence shows that when the 
mortgage foreclosure proceedings :were had there was 
no oath of office of Roger T. Harmston in the matter 
of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, but no such oath 
of office could be found at the time of the trial of 
this case in the court ~elow. It would be a travesty 
on the law if a judgment of :a court could be rendered 
vulnerable to attack solely because a p·art of the files 
in a matter had been lost or destroyed and the Clerk of 
the C-ourt had neglected to make a proper record 
thereof. 
ROGER T. HARMS TON WAS THE DE FACTO IF NOT 
THE DE JURE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED, AND AS SUCH 
SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON HIM WO·ULD BE BINDING 
UPON THE ESTATE. 
The record in this case shows not only that the 
pl!aintiff was, by the court, appointed administrator 
of the e-state of Isabelle T. Harmston, and that he 
furnished and signed a bond as fixed by the court, 
but also that he collected some of the rents of the 
property belonging to the estate (Trs. 46). 
If the plaintiff did not take the oath of office when 
he filed his bond, he was negligent in failing to do 
so and he m'ay not take advantage of his own negli-
gence. Harris v. Coates, et al, 69 Pac. 475. To the 
same effect is Harris v. Chipman, 9 Utah 101. In the 
case of Anderson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 76 Utah 
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324, 289 Pac~ 156, it is held that an action brought by 
an 'administrator before he has . qualified will not be 
dismissed if he qualifie.s during the course of the trial. 
In the case of Colorado Development ·Co. v. Greer, 80 
Pac. (2d) 914; 920 it is said: "One may not at the 
same time perform the functions of an office and_ main-
tain successfully that he has ahandoned it. Tooele 
County v. DeLa Mare, 90 Utah 46, 59 Pac. (2d) 1155; 
106 A.L.R. 182. '' 
Before concluding this brief we should probably 
call to the attention of the court the case · of Roger· T. 
Harmston, et al vs. Kenneth Labrum, et al. In that 
case the plaintiff seeks to quiet title to the lands 
therein described. The Labrums acquired title to those 
lands by purchase from the Farmers and Merchants 
Bank after the Bank had secured a Sheriff's Deed 
pursuant to its mortgage foreclosure. As we under-
stand plaintiffs' position, it is that the hank acquired 
no interest by its mortgage foreclosure proceedings 
and therefore had no title to pass on to the Labrums. 
It will be noted that no attack whatsoever is made 
upon, nor is there any mention of the decree of fore-
closure in the complaint ag-ainst the Labrums. That 
being so, any attempt to attack the mortgage foreclosure 
decrees in that case would clearly be a collateral at-
tack on the judgment in the foreclosure proceedingS, 
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and as such binding upon the plaintiff under the doc-
trine announced by the cases heretofore cited from this 
and other jurisdictions touching the binding . effect of 
judgments when an attempt is made to attack the same 
in a collateral proceeding .. 
We submit the judgments appealed from should be 
affirmed with costs to respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. RULON MORGAN 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
